While the Brewers chased a pennant and the Dodgers extend their October tradition, the Pirates are watching from home for a 10th straight year.
Since he took over in November 2019, Ben Cherington's first four draft classes accounted for $61.3 million in signing bonuses for 64 of 69 picks. Yet only two hitters—Henry Davis and Nick Gonzales—have reached the majors after spending $25.7 million on position players, a hauntingly thin yield for a franchise desperate to escape its rebuilding purgatory.
When the Pirates hired Cherington, the hope was that his pedigree in scouting and player development would breathe life into a stagnant franchise that clings to the draft as their strategic lifeline. Instead, the organization doubled down on pitching-heavy drafts, a strategy that now looks increasingly flawed.
With the team unlikely to exceed its modest $100 million payroll in 2026, and hitting emerging as the most coveted asset, the Pirates finds themselves in a bind where they’re short on offensive talent and boxed in financially.
From 2020 to 2023, the Pirates used just 34.78% of their draft picks on hitters, signing 22 of 24 position players who have produced a combined 0.6 WAR —mostly from Gonzales (2.2), offset by Davis’ -1.6.
The percentage of hitters lags behind peers like the Orioles (50.7%), Athletics (47.76%), Brewers (45.59%), Cardinals (44.78%), Royals (41.18%) and Reds (40.85%).
The Guardians selected 22 hitters — 31.8% of their draft picks and $16.6 million — who combined for just 0.3 WAR, the only total lower than the Pirates’ 0.6. Yet unlike Pittsburgh, every other team in that span not only drafted hitters at a higher rate but also saw greater returns. For a franchise that staked its rebuild on pitching, the Pirates’ failure to develop impact bats is starting to look like a critical and costly misstep.
If you’re looking for others in those draft classes to possibly work their way up to the team, Termarr Johnson, Mitch Jebb, and Nick Cimillo appear to be the last three standing. Each should get playing time in Class AAA Indianapolis in 2026.
Two position players from those classes reaching the majors is a warning light about talent identification and player development. When the draft is the primary pipeline, organizational flaws in coaching, evaluation and promotion become existential problems. The Pirates’ minimal WAR contribution from hitters signals that either the scouting was failing to project bat-to-ball skills or the development infrastructure failed to cultivate them. Either way, responsibility traces back to the decision-makers.
THE ASYLUM
Draft analysis: $25.7 million for two hitters
While the Brewers chased a pennant and the Dodgers extend their October tradition, the Pirates are watching from home for a 10th straight year.
Since he took over in November 2019, Ben Cherington's first four draft classes accounted for $61.3 million in signing bonuses for 64 of 69 picks. Yet only two hitters—Henry Davis and Nick Gonzales—have reached the majors after spending $25.7 million on position players, a hauntingly thin yield for a franchise desperate to escape its rebuilding purgatory.
When the Pirates hired Cherington, the hope was that his pedigree in scouting and player development would breathe life into a stagnant franchise that clings to the draft as their strategic lifeline. Instead, the organization doubled down on pitching-heavy drafts, a strategy that now looks increasingly flawed.
With the team unlikely to exceed its modest $100 million payroll in 2026, and hitting emerging as the most coveted asset, the Pirates finds themselves in a bind where they’re short on offensive talent and boxed in financially.
From 2020 to 2023, the Pirates used just 34.78% of their draft picks on hitters, signing 22 of 24 position players who have produced a combined 0.6 WAR —mostly from Gonzales (2.2), offset by Davis’ -1.6.
The percentage of hitters lags behind peers like the Orioles (50.7%), Athletics (47.76%), Brewers (45.59%), Cardinals (44.78%), Royals (41.18%) and Reds (40.85%).
The Guardians selected 22 hitters — 31.8% of their draft picks and $16.6 million — who combined for just 0.3 WAR, the only total lower than the Pirates’ 0.6. Yet unlike Pittsburgh, every other team in that span not only drafted hitters at a higher rate but also saw greater returns. For a franchise that staked its rebuild on pitching, the Pirates’ failure to develop impact bats is starting to look like a critical and costly misstep.
If you’re looking for others in those draft classes to possibly work their way up to the team, Termarr Johnson, Mitch Jebb, and Nick Cimillo appear to be the last three standing. Each should get playing time in Class AAA Indianapolis in 2026.
Two position players from those classes reaching the majors is a warning light about talent identification and player development. When the draft is the primary pipeline, organizational flaws in coaching, evaluation and promotion become existential problems. The Pirates’ minimal WAR contribution from hitters signals that either the scouting was failing to project bat-to-ball skills or the development infrastructure failed to cultivate them. Either way, responsibility traces back to the decision-makers.
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